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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IS IN A SUPERIOR POSITION TO 
ASSESS WITNESS CREDIBIIITY . 
The function of the administrative law judge in the workers7 compensation 
setting is akin to the function of the fact-finder in the civil arena. Therefore, the 
administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should 
generally be binding on the reviewing court, which in this case is the Appeals 
Board. The administrative law judge, not the Appeals Board is in the best position 
to make a credibility determination, and as such, a credibility determination of a 
witness should only be overturned if it is clearly erroneous. In this case, there was 
substantial evidence to support the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge, and 
therefore, they should have been upheld. By finding that the Administrative Law 
Judge is not in a position to make credibility determinations, we are in effect taking 
away any role that the Administrative Law Judge may play in the adjudicative 
process. If the Administrative Law Judge does not have any role to fulfill, why not 
eliminate the position altogether and send the cases right to the Appeals Board and 
let them make the determination. Why have an Administrative Law Judge if the 
Appeals Board is going to ignore the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and 
enter its own finding and conclusions. 
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A. The Appeals Board must consider the Findings of the 
Administrative Law ludge. 
The Respondent's reliance on United States Steel v. Industrial Com'n, 607 
P.2d 807 (Utah 1980), is misplaced. While it is true that it was held that the 
Commission may make its own findings on the credibility of the evidence 
presented, the Supreme Court also held that in so doing, the Commission must 
consider the findings of the Administrative Law Judge as part of the record. kL at 
810; See also Adams v. Industrial Common of Arizona. 710 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ariz. 
App. 1985)("Normally, a proper credibility evaluation requires that the fact finder 
hear and observe the witness. Credibility is not readily discernible by one who 
merely reads a cold record."). 
In United States Steel the Administrative Law Judge found there was not an 
industrial accident, which finding was then overturned by the Commission. The 
Commission found that the applicant's failure to report an accident sheds light on 
whether an accident occurred, but is not enough for denying relief, j d . at 812. 
Although there was similar conflicting testimony with regards to Ms. Chambers' 
reporting of the accident, and that of the applicant in United States Steel, the 
similarities between the two cases ends there. The focus in United States Steel was 
on the applicant's failure to report the injury. The Appeals Board in this case 
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incorrectly reversed the credibility determination made by the administrative law 
judge focusing only on the evidence surrounding the reporting of the accident. 
(See, R. 261-263; Order of Remand, page 2). However, as pointed out in the Brief 
of Appellant, the fact that the applicant failed to immediately report the accident is 
only one fact that was considered by the administrative law judge in its credibility 
determination, and the Appeals Board reversal of the administrative law judge's 
credibility determination on this fact alone was clearly erroneous. There were also 
other issues that were analyzed by the administrative law judge in making its 
credibility determination of the applicant. The Administrative Law Judge was able 
to observe and witness the applicant as she gave her testimony. The applicant also 
began working full-time for another employer the day after the alleged accident. It 
was also reported by the applicant that she was unable to pursue treatments for her 
alleged back injury because Red Cliff denied compensation benefits. (R. 330, page 
38 lines 13-15). However, upon cross examination, the applicant testified that 
treatments were not stopped due to a lack of money as she had earlier testified. (R. 
330, page 74 lines 10-21). Next, the applicant reported that she reported her injury 
to Val Penman, an employee at Red Cliffs (R. 330, page 28 lines 14-23)., however, 
he did not remember every talking to the applicant about a work injury. (R. 330, 
page 103 lines 15-20). He testified that if she would have notified him, he would 
have filled out an incident report since which was the standard procedure. 
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Furthermore, Respondent fails to point out that the Court in United States 
Steel, held that the findings of the Administrative Law Judge must be considered as 
part of the record. Respondent also fails to address a more recent case decided by 
the Supreme Court where it was held that the trier of fact or the hearer of evidence 
is in the best position to ascertain credibility of witnesses, and as such, deference 
should be given to the initial decision maker on questions of fact because it stands 
in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the 
credibility and accuracy of witnesses. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 1 77 
(Utah 1997). Similarly, it has been held that the Administrative Law Judge's findings 
are to be affirmed as long as the evidence supports those findings. See Birrell v. 
Ind. Comm'n. 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). 
In the case at hand, the Administrative Law Judge, not the Appeals Board 
heard the evidence and witnessed the testimony of the various witnesses. As such, 
the Administrative Law Judge was clearly in a superior position to evaluate and 
weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. The Appeal Board 
was required to considered the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge and should 
have given deference to the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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B. The function of the Administrative Law ludge is similar to that of 
the fact-finder in the civil arena. 
The function of the administrative law judge in the workers' compensation 
setting is akin to the function of the fact-finder in the civil arena. Adams v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Arizona. 710 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Ariz. App. 1985). 
Respondent attempts to distinguish this case on the basis that the system used in 
Arizona is not comparable to Utah's system because the ALJ's decision constitutes 
final agency action as opposed to Utah's system which allows additional agency 
action. In addition, Respondent points out that in Adams the question involved a 
replacement ALj substituting its own findings for the original ALj. (See Appellee's 
Brief at page 16). Contrary to Respondents position the underlying issues addressed 
in Adams, and those in this case are the same. In both the Arizona case and this 
case, the findings of the original ALJ are being substituted or replaced by a 
reviewing individual or board. As such, the holding and reasoning in Adams, can 
be applied here. Appellate courts have therefore consistently espoused the rule that 
the administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally 
binding on the reviewing court. The purpose of this rule is that the fact finder is in 
the best position to consider the voice tone, hesitation or readiness with answers, 
his eyes, pitch or uncertainty of the witness's voice, gestures, expressions, and other 
non verbal communication. ]d. Much like Adams or in a civil arena, the fact-finder, 
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who in this case would be the Administrative Law Judge, is in the best position to 
consider credibility of a witness as they testify and deference should be given. 
In this particular case, the administrative law judge, not the appeals board 
was in a position to observe the countenance and candor of the Applicant as she 
attempted to testify. What the administrative law judge observed as the Applicant 
testified, could not be reviewed or observed by the Appeals Board by reviewing a 
written record. By only reviewing the written testimony, the Appeals Board is only 
reviewing part of the testimony of the Applicant. The applicant's voice tone, facial 
expression, body language, skin tones, fidgety movements, the confidence in her 
answers, lack of eye contact, all affect the credibility determination made by the 
administrative law judge which the Appeals Board was unable to review by looking 
at the written record. These are all items that cannot be reviewed by the Appeals 
Board, and historically are items that have not been the subject of an appeal. The 
administrative law judge who takes the actual evidence and reviews the testimony is 
in the best position to feel what is being presented and to get a sense of the 
applicant's credibility. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
Therefore, the Appeals Board failure to consider the Findings of the Administrative 
Law Judge was improper, and the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge should 
be upheld as they were supported by substantial evidence. The Appeals Board 
failed to show or find that the ALJ's findings were clearly wrong. 
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It is clear from the evidence that the Appeals Board reversal of the 
administrative law judge's credibility determination based solely on the fact that the 
applicant may or may not have immediately reported the accident is contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. As stated above, there were numerous other factors which 
the administrative law judge based his credibility determination on besides the fact 
that the applicant did not immediately report her injury. The administrative law 
judge, not the Appeals Board is in the best position to make a credibility 
determination, and such determination should only be overturned if it is clearly 
erroneous. In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge, and therefore, they should have been upheld. 
II THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IMPROPERLY AWARDED 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AS THE APPLICANT HAD REACHED 
STABILIZATION. 
It has been held that "every person who brings a claim in a court or at a 
hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive a 
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal/' Bunnell v. Ind. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(Utah 1987). The administrative law judge initially found that because of the 
applicant's lack of credibility, there was no industrial accident. Therefore, there was 
no need for Red Cliff to present any evidence regarding the applicant's claim for 
temporary disability payments. However, due to the Appeals Board reversal of the 
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decision of the administrative law judge, the administrative law judge found that the 
applicant was entitled to temporary partial disability payments through August 25, 
1997. (R. 274-278). The administrative law judge's award of temporary disability 
payments exceed the time in which the applicant had reached medical stabilization, 
and therefore it should be at a minimum modified to reflect only the time until the 
applicant had reached stabilization. 
A. Stabilization occurs at that point in time that there is nothing more that 
can be done. 
When a claimant reaches medical stabilization, she is no longer eligible for 
temporary benefits. Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 754 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The administrative law judge's award of temporary partial disability 
payments through August 25, 1997, exceeded the time in which the applicant had 
reached medical stabilization. (R. 274-278). Temporary disability benefits are to be 
discontinued as soon as the point of medical stabilization is reached. Reddish v. 
Sentinel Consumer Prods.. 771 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The medical 
records clearly indicate that the applicant had reached stabilization long before 
August 25, 1997, therefore, the administrative law judge erred in extending 
disability payments past the point at which the applicant had reached stabilization. 
The medical records are clear that the applicant had reached stabilization long 
before August 25, 1997, as the applicant did not seek any treatment for her back 
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after April of 1997. (R. 330, page 81). Another key indicator that the applicant had 
reached stabilization long before August of 1997, was the fact that it was reported 
there was nothing more that could be done, therefore therapy for her back was 
discontinued. (R. 330, page 74). Furthermore, there is no indication in the medical 
records that the applicant had not healed from the alleged accident. The fact that it 
was reported there was nothing more that could be done for the applicant along 
with no indication whatsoever in the records that the applicant had not healed from 
the alleged accident indicates that stabilization had occurred. 
B. Temporary disability payments are not proper as the applicant began 
working full-time for another employer immediately after the accident. 
Temporary disability ceases when the claimant returns to work initially 
following accident. Sanderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 400 P.2d 756 (Utah 1965). 
Temporary disability payments "are intended to compensate a [worker] during the 
period of healing and until she is able to return to work. . ." Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. v. Ortega. 562 P.2d 617, 619-20 (Utah 1977); Second Injury Fund v. 
Streator Chevrolet. 709 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985). The applicant was clearly able to 
return to work as she went to full-time status the very next day at her other job 
Therefore, an award of temporary disability was improper and should be 
overturned. 
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Prior to the alleged accident, the applicant had only been working part-time 
at both places of employment, and immediately after the accident she began 
working full-time for her other employer, Washington ARC. (R. 330, page 46 lines 
15-18; R. 57). As previously stated, the record is clear that the Ms. Chambers was 
able to perform light duty work as she continue working for Washington ARC, and 
went to work the very next day. Another important factor is the fact that Ms. 
Chambers went from a part-time employee working approximately 18-20 hours per 
week to basically a full time employee immediately after the accident. 
Providing Red Cliff the opportunity for a hearing would have allowed them to 
point out the evidence that was already before the judge in the form of the medical 
records exhibit, which clearly refuted the applicant's claim for temporary disability 
payments, which at a minimum, would have established that she had reached 
medical stabilization in March I997. Any temporary disability payments should 
have ceased in March of 1997, as the medical records clearly established that the 
applicant had reached stabilization. Temporary disability payments are to be 
discontinued upon returning to work. The applicant never missed work because of 
the accident, therefore, Red Cliffs should not be required to pay any type of 
temporary disability payments to the applicant. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Red Cliff respectfully requests that the findings of 
fact of the Appeals Board be set aside and order that the administrative law judge 
findings as to the credibility determination be upheld. In the alternative, Red Cliffs 
request that the decision by the administrative law judge denying them of a hearing 
with regards to temporary disability be overturned. Finally, Red Cliffs requests that 
the award for temporary disability payments be overturned as it should not be 
required to pay any temporary disability because the applicant was able to perform 
light duty work, and refused to perform light duty work at Red Cliffs, but rather 
began working full-time for another employer. 
DATED this the J j _ day of July, 1999. 
PLANT^WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
ROBERT COLSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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